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Abstract
It is well-known that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks. Recent studies show that well-designed classification parts can lead
to better robustness. However, there is still much space for improvement
along this line. In this paper, we first prove that, from a geometric point
of view, the robustness of a neural network is equivalent to some angular
margin condition of the classifier weights. We then explain why ReLU type
function is not a good choice for activation under this framework. These find-
ings reveal the limitations of the existing approaches and lead us to develop
a novel light-weight-penalized defensive method, which is simple and has a
good scalability. Empirical results on multiple benchmark datasets demon-
strate that our method can effectively improve the robustness of the network
without requiring too much additional computation, while maintaining a high
classification precision for clean data.
Keywords: adversarial robustness, classification layer, geometric point of
view, prediction accuracy, weight penalization
1. Introduction
Although deep neural network (DNN) has achieved state-of-the-art per-
formance on many challenging computer vision tasks [9, 10, 14, 15, 19, 40, 43],
it was found that they are susceptible to some crafted adversarial samples
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[4, 29]: very small and often imperceptible perturbations of the data sam-
ples are sufficient to fool state-of-the-art classifiers and result in incorrect
classification.
This phenomenon has received particular attention. Recently, there has
been a great deal of interest in developing various defense mechanisms to en-
hance the robustness of neural networks. Examples include defensive distilla-
tion [2, 24], feature squeezing [39], obfuscated gradients [5, 20, 30], adversarial
training [17, 32, 33, 38], and several other versions [6, 21, 26, 36]. However,
some powerful defensive methods such as adversarial training [17, 38] suffer
from heavy computational cost and are nearly intractable on large scale prob-
lems. Besides, a large number of them improve robustness at the expense
of the accuracy of clean data [31, 42]. Recent studies [18, 26, 27] show that
well-designed classifiers can effectively learn more structured representations,
thus greatly improving the robustness of neural networks. However, there is
still much room for improvement along this line.
With this paper, we aim to propose a novel defensive method by designing
a special weight penalization mechanism for the classification part. We first
argue that, from a geometric point of view, the robustness of a neural network
can be depicted by certain angular margin condition on classifier weights (see
Section 2.2). Increasing the angular margins between different weight vectors
is helpful to raise the robustness of the neural network. Secondly, we point
out that, in terms of classification robustness, the commonly used ReLU type
function is not a good activation choice in a framework like ours. Based on
the above findings, a special light-weight-regularization term is proposed to
the commonly used loss function to advance both the robustness and the
accuracy of the models. Extensive experiments on three datasets show that
our method can achieve good robustness under some typical attacks while
maintaining high accuracy to clean data.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
(1) We prove that the robustness of the neural networks is equivalent to
certain angular margin condition between the weight vectors of the
classifier. We further point out that in a framework like ours, a sat-
urated function such as Tanh is a more appropriate activation option
than the commonly used ReLU function.
(2) We design a novel light penalty defense mechanism that only needs
to control the weight vectors at the classification part to improve the
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robustness of the neural network. The proposed method is simple and
could be easily used in various neural network architectures.
(3) Empirical performances on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 datasets
show that the proposed approach has reliable robustness against dif-
ferent adversarial attacks in different networks, while maintaining high
classification accuracy for clean inputs. In most cases, our method
outperforms the compared benchmark defense approaches.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
related works on defensive approaches and attack models. Our method is
formally launched and introduced in Section 3. Experimental results under
different threat models, as well as comparisons to other defense methods, are
presented in Section 4. The conclusion is drawn in Section 5. Details of the
theoretical analysis are left in the appendix.
2. Related Works
2.1. Defense methods
Previous efforts to improve the robustness of deep learning models are en-
couraging [1, 5, 20, 17, 26, 28, 30, 37]. Among them, adversarial training [17]
is one of the most effective means of defense. Adversarial training involves
putting the adversary in the training loop, and perturbing each training
sample before it is passed through the model. One of the main drawbacks of
adversarial training is its high computational cost, each stochastic gradient
descent iteration using multiple gradient computations to generate adversar-
ial samples, which limits its application in large-scale problems. Although
there appears a number of fast procedures [32, 41], this problem still exists.
Another problem with adversarial training is that the improved robustness
comes at the expense of the prediction accuracy of clean inputs [31, 42].
To save the computational cost and ensure predictive accuracy on clean
data, some recent studies aim to improve the linear classification part of the
neural network to produce reliable robustness. Wan & Zhong et al. [36] and
Wang et al. [37] have designed some regularization items in the classifier loss
function to increase the dispersion between classes of feature representation.
Recently, Pang et al. [26, 27] further present some novel loss functions based
on Max Mahalanobis distribution to learn more structured representations
and to induce high-density regions in feature space. Although our approach
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shares some similar spirit as the work of [26, 27], there exist two critical
differences:
• In [26, 27], the weights on the classification layer were explicitly defined
to meet the angular margin condition. This explicit definition may limit
the learning ability of the networks, especially when the dimension of
the feature representations are greater than the number of the neurons
in the classification layer. On the contrary, our method implicitly treats
the weights restriction as a regular term in the optimization objective.
Such modification makes the networks more flexible and have better
learning ability.
• ReLU function is a popular activation choice in deep learning neural
networks, which was also used in [26, 27]. However, according to our
analysis in Section 3.2, we find that ReLU function is not a good choice
in a framework like ours. Instead, using saturate activation functions
like Tanh may improve the robustness of the model.
2.2. Attack models
A large amount of attack models and algorithms have been introduced
in recent years [2, 4, 16, 17, 28, 29]. The purpose of these attack models
is to look for a small and undetectable perturbation to add to the input,
thus generating adversarial examples. In this article, we mainly consider the
following four attack approaches.
DeepFool [16] aims to find the minimum adversarial perturbations on
both an affine binary classifier and a general binary differentiable classifier.
Carlini & Wagner Attack (C&W) [2] is a widely used attack method
which applies a binary search mechanism on its hyperparameters to find the
minimal l2 distortion for a successful attack.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [17] starts from a random posi-
tion in the clean image neighborhood and applies FGSM [4] for m iterations
with a step size of α. More specifically, for a given iterative number m and
a small adversarial manipulation budget ǫ,
xˆi = xi−1 + α · sign(∇xi−1L(xi−1, y)),
xi = clip(xˆi, x− ǫ, x+ ǫ), i = 1, . . . , m,
where L denotes the classification loss and clip(·) projects xˆi into the l∞ ball
around x with radius ǫ. PGD is one of the most powerful iterative attacks
that relies on the first-order information of the target model.
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Multi-Target Attack (MTA) [34] is a recently proposed adaptive at-
tack, which directly minimizes the Max Mahalanobis center loss for each
target class.
3. Robust Neural Network via Weight Penalization
A typical feed forward neural network consists of a nonlinear feature
extraction part that transforms the input x to certain feature representation
f(x):
x→ f(x) := φ(h(x)),
where φ denotes the activation function applied to the last layer of the en-
coder, and h(x) is the feature representation before activation.
With f(x), we can define the following linear classifier:
c(x) = Wf(x) + b, (3.1)
where W and b are the weight matrix and bias vector of the classification
layer, respectively. Then one can use c(x) to predict the category of the input
x.
When only the accuracy of classification is considered, neural networks
only need to learn the features that are linearly separable. However, it was
soon realized that these features are not robust under adversarial attack.
Given a clean sample x, an adversarial attack attempts to find a crafted
sample x′ such that
yˆ(x′) 6= yˆ(x), s.t. ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ ǫ,
where yˆ(·) denotes the prediction label from the classifier and ‖ · ‖ is some
vector norm.
3.1. Robustness from a geometric point view
Inspired by the analysis in [37], in this section we aim to relate the robust-
ness of neural networks to the angular margin between the classifier weights.
The bias b in (3.1) is geometrically less informative, so we assume that b is
zero for brevity.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: From the geometric point of view, pattern (b) is more robust than pattern (a).
Assume that the feature representation f(x) ∈ RP and weight matrix
W ∈ RK×P , where P is the dimension of the learned features and K is the
number of categories. Define the classification domains as follows
Ai := {f ∈ RP : (wi − wj)Tf ≥ 0, j 6= i}, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, (3.2)
where wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, is the i-th row of W . If the learned feature of an input
belongs to domain Ai, then we predict it to the class i .
Suppose that there exists an input x whose feature representation f(x)
belongs to Ai (see e.g. Figure 1). Note that
(wi − wj)Tf(x) = ‖wi − wj‖2‖f(x)‖2 cos θfij , j 6= i, (3.3)
where θfij denotes the angle between f(x) and wi−wj . From (3.2) and (3.3),
to make f(x′) belong to Aj, where ‖x′−x‖ ≤ ǫ, a successful attacker needs to
rotate f(x) at least pi
2
−θfij degrees. As a consequence, for a fixed perturbation
amplitude, the smaller the angle θij , the harder the attack. In other words,
the smaller
max
1≤i,j≤K
j 6=i
{θfij}, (3.4)
the more robust the neural network will be.
Further, for a well-trained robust neural networks, thanks to the universal
approximation property [12, 22], we can expect that all data features are
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concentrated in the middle of the classification areas. Therefore, we have
θfij ≈ pi2 − ∠(wi,wj)2 . Combining this approximation with (3.4), we deduce that
the larger
min
1≤i,j≤K
j 6=i
∠(wi, wj)
2
(3.5)
the more robust the neural network will be. Nevertheless, this conclusion is
not applicable directly to optimization. In the following discussion, we will
present some equivalent theoretical results that can be directly applied to
the optimization objective.
Theorem 1. Let W ∈ RK×P be the weight matrix of the classification layer,
where K denotes the number of categories and P is the dimension of the
learned features. Assume that 1 < K ≤ P + 1. For simplicity, we assume
that all column vectors of W have the same length s. Then (3.5) achieves
the maximum if and only if W satisfies
wTi wj =
s2
1−K , ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ K, j 6= i. (3.6)
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 1. The assumption that 1 < K ≤ P + 1 almost always holds true
in computational vision tasks. Note that there is a similar theoretical result
in the literature [26]. But an additional assumption
∑K
i=1wi = 0 is needed
there.
Remark 2. According to Theorem 1, to obtain a robust neural network, the
weight vectors of the classification layer must be uniformly distributed in the
latent feature space (see e.g. Figure 1 (b)).
It is trivial that the condition (3.6) has an equivalent matrix form
WW T = Σ (3.7)
where the entries of the matrix Σ satisfies
Σij =
{
s2, i = j
s2
1−K
, i 6= j .
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Now we impose the constraint (3.7) into the loss function and obtain the
following complete optimization objective:
L := LSCE + α‖WW T − Σ‖2, (3.8)
where LSCE represents the commonly used softmax cross-entropy loss, α and
s are hyperparameters.
It is obvious that the proposed method has a clear geometric background
and is easy to implement, only an additional weight penalization on the
classification layer requiring to be considered.
3.2. ReLU type function is not a good choice for activation
Non-saturated functions such as ReLU [19] and PReLU [7] are commonly
used in activation units due to their simpleness and effectiveness. Nonethe-
less, if these activation functions are used in a framework like ours, two
problems may arise.
First, consider the example shown in Figure 2, where the category number
K = 3 and the feature dimension P = 2. Although the weight vectors have
been evenly distributed in the feature space, we find that w3 belongs to the
third quadrant, and therefore both of its components are negative. Notice
that the value of the ReLU activation function is always positive, which leads
to the fact wT3 f(x) ≤ 0 regardless of the label of the input. According to
(3.2), it implies that all inputs belong to the class 3 will be misclassified.
Therefore, the use of ReLU type activation function might deteriorate the
classification accuracy of the model. Such case is very likely to happen if the
weights are fixed in advance as done in [26]. Instead, if we adopt an activation
function like Tanh, which belongs to (−1, 1), the above phenomena can be
avoided.
Secondly, suppose that a neural network has already learned linearly sep-
arable features after several epoches. Given a training sample (x, y), where
y ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}, it follows from (3.2) that (wy − wj)Tf(x) > 0 , ∀j 6= y.
Note that
LSCE(x, y) = − log
exp(wTy f(x))∑K
j=1 exp(w
T
j f(x))
= − log 1∑K
j=1 exp(−f(x)T (wy − wj))
.
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Figure 2: An example using ReLU activation function fails to give the correct classification.
Then,
lim
0<β→+∞
− log 1∑K
j=1 exp(−βf(x)T (wy − wj))
= 0.
Since the value of ReLU type function belongs to [0,+∞), we can infer from
the above two equations that if a ReLU type activation is used, after the
neural network is trained to a certain extent, it does not need to pay attention
to the second penalty term in (3.8), but only needs to simply prolong the
length of feature vector, to reduce the total loss. However, according to the
analysis in Section 3.1, prolonging the length of features is not helpful to
improve the robustness of the neural network, because the cost of rotating
a feature vector from one region to another is unchanged. On the contrary,
if a saturated activation like Tanh is used, the length of feature vector is
bounded in the interval (0,
√
P ). So, in order to reduce the total training
loss, the neural network must take care of the penalty term in (3.8) and thus
could learn more robust features.
According to the analysis above, in this paper, we choose Tanh as the
activation function in the last layer of the encoder part, i.e.,
f(x) = Tanh(h(x)).
We depict the features exacted based on ReLU and Tanh activations in Figure
3, respectively. Consistent with our analysis, the features exacted based
on Tanh activation are more compact and far from the decision boundary.
Therefore, an adversarial attack which only makes small changes to the input
is less likely to succeed.
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Figure 3: t-SNE [35] visualization of latent features on the test data of CIFAR-10, where
the index numbers indicate classes 0 to 9.
4. Experiments
In this section, we will test the robustness and classification accuracy of
the proposed method over different networks and different data sets.
The attack methods introduced in Section 2.2, including PGD [17], Deep-
Fool [16], C&W [2] and the multi-target attack (MTA) [11], are applied in our
experiments. Among them, PGD, DeepFool, MTA are iterative-based meth-
ods, which usually iterate less than hundreds of rounds to craft an adversarial
example. On the other hand, C&W is an optimization-based method, which
require a much more computation compared to the iterative-based methods,
but usually has higher success rates on attacking classifiers.
According to the suggestions of the literature, Table 1 lists the hyperpa-
rameters of these attack methods, including the number of iterations, step
size and overshoot. We shall use PGD20 to denote a PGD attack with 20
iteration steps. In the following text, similar symbols indicate similar mean-
ings.
Table 1: The basic setup for four adversarial attacks
PGD C&W MTA DeepFool
number of iterations 20 40 100 200 1000 100 200 50
step size 0.0031 0.01 0.0031 0.01 0.01 0.0031 0.01 0.02(overshoot)
We consider three popular benchmark datasets, including MNIST [15],
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [14]. Following the suggestions in [3], for PGD,
DeepFool and MTA adversarial attacks, we consider l∞ adversarial perturba-
tions and set the perturbation amplitude ǫ = 0.3 for MNIST and ǫ = 8/255
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for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. For C&W attack, we consider l2 perturba-
tions and set ǫ = 3 for MNIST and ǫ = 1 for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
We compare our method with four baseline defensive algorithms, includ-
ing AdvTraining [17], TRADES [42], MART [38] and MMC [27]. Among
them, AdvTraining is regarded as one of the most effective defenses. TRADES
is a defensive method which keeps a good tradeoff between the adversarial
robustness and the prediction accuracy. MART is based on AdvTraining
but explicitly differentiates the misclassified and correctly classified examples
during the training. MMC is an improved version of the defense approach
proposed in [26] and has a similar starting point to our approach.
If it is not stated otherwise, the hyperparameters in (3.8) are fixed as
α = 100 and s = 0.1, and hyperparameters of all compared methods are
selected according to the original literature.
4.1. Performance on large-scale networks
In this section, we first compare our method with the baseline defensive
algorithms on CIFAR-10 dataset using large-scale networks. All clean images
are normalized and transformed by 4-pixel padding with 32×32 random crop
and horizontal flip.
For our method, we use the same neural network architecture as [17, 42],
i.e., the wide residual network WRN-34-10 [40]. We apply the Adam [13]
optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.01 which decays with a factor of
0.9 for each 60 training epoches, and run 400 epochs on the training dataset.
The experimental results of the compared approaches are directly cited from
the literature.
Table 2: Classification accuracy on the clean and the adversarial examples on CIFAR-10.
Methods Networks Attacks Clean accuracy Robust accuracy
AdvTraining [17] WRN-34-10 PGD20 87.30% 47.04%
MART [38] WRN-34-10 PGD20 84.17% 58.56%
MMC [27] ResNet-32 PGD10 92.70% 36.00%
MMC [27] ResNet-32 PGD50 92.70% 24.80%
TRADES [42] WRN-34-10 PGD20 84.92% 56.61%
TRADES [42] WRN-34-10 DeepFool 84.92% 61.38%
TRADES [42] WRN-34-10 C&W 84.92% 81.24%
Ours WRN-34-10 PGD20 94.10% 78.40%
Ours WRN-34-10 DeepFool 94.10% 79.92%
Ours WRN-34-10 C&W 94.10% 83.42%
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According to the results in Table 2, we can see that the proposed defense
method can significantly improve the robustness of the model, while still
maintaining a high prediction accuracy for clean data. It outperforms the
compared methods in both accuracy and robustness.
Next, we consider the CIFAR-100 dataset. As we know, CIFAR-100 is a
more complex dataset than CIFAR-10. In Table 3, we report the prediction
accuracy and robustness performance of our method on CIFA-100 dataset
under various attacks. Obviously, our method is still effective in this complex
dataset.
Table 3: Classification accuracy of our method on CIFAR-100 dataset.
CIFAR-100
Methods Clean PGD20 PGD100 DeepFool C&W
Ours 73.84% 47.17% 46.47% 55.21% 54.82%
4.2. Performance on small networks
Most previous defensive algorithms were experimented with large-scale
neural networks like ResNet [8]. However, under some resource constrained
situations, we have to turn to small networks due to their compute and power
efficiency. In this section, we are interested in the performance of the new
method on small networks.
Specially, we consider a small network [2, 24] which only includes four
convolutional layers. We compare our method with AdvTraining [17] and
MMC [27] in this small network. We apply the Adam [13] optimizer with
the learning rate of 0.01, and run for 400 epochs on the training samples.
Table 4: Classification accuracy on the clean and the adversarial examples on MNIST
using a small network.
MNIST
Methods Clean PGD40 PGD200 DeepFool C&W MTA200
AdvTraining 99.47% 96.38% 94.58% 96.79% 39.82% 98.57%
MMC 89.55% 35.98% 34.91% 34.12% 2.08% 12.40%
Ours 99.39% 81.90% 80.39% 97.28% 97.95% 88.31%
It is observed from Tables 4 and 5 that AdvTraining has a relative better
performance on simple MNIST dataset. However, on more complex CIFAR-
10 dataset, the performance of AdvTraining declined significantly. On the
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Table 5: Classification accuracy on the clean and the adversarial examples on CIFAR-10
using a small network.
CIFAR-10
Methods Clean PGD20 PGD100 DeepFool C&W MTA100
AdvTraining 68.81% 21.36% 18.94% 24.68% 10.91% 57.15%
MMC 73.30% 39.23% 38.96% 16.86% 1.49% 25.96%
Ours 81.43% 57.11% 56.22% 59.11% 59.11% 64.88%
contrary, the performance of the other two methods is more consistent on
both datasets. We may infer from the above phenomenon that AdvTraining
method is more dependent on the representative ability of the networks, and
a small network seems not sufficient to support it to learn useful features on
complex datasets. Moreover, it is worth to notice that MMC fails against
C&W1000 and MTA100 attacks, while our method still exhibits excellent
robustness.
                 
 ( S R F K H V
    
    
    
    
    
 $ F
 F X
 U D
 F \
  D   $ G Y H U V D U L D O  W U D L Q L Q J  V D P S O H V
 $ G Y 7 U D L Q L Q J
 0 0 &
 2 X U V
                 
 ( S R F K H V
    
    
    
    
    
  E   $ G Y H U V D U L D O  W H V W  V D P S O H V
Figure 4: Training and test accuracy of AT, MMC and our method with increasing epoches
on CIFAR-10 dataset. The robustness is evaluated under PGD20 attack.
Next, we depict the training curves of three defensive methods under
PGD20 attack on CIFAR10 dataset. As shown in Figure 4, for AdvTrain-
ing, the test accuracy under adversarial attacks has a clear decline after
few epoches, while the curves of the other two methods keep stable. This
is an obvious over-fitting phenomenon, which indicates that when using a
small networks, AdvTraining seems to just memorize the adversarial sam-
ples, rather than learning the robust features.
4.3. Ablation study
In this section, we aim to test the performance of our method under
various configurations. We apply PGD40 attack on MNIST dataset and
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Figure 5: Classification accuracy on clean and adversarial samples with various α and s.
PGD20 attack on CIFAR-10 dataset.
We first investigate the effects of hyperparameters α and s of (3.8). As
shown in Figure 5, different hyperparameters have little impact on classifi-
cation accuracy on clean data, while for adversarial examples, the selection
of hyperparameters has a great impact on the accuracy.
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Figure 6: Classification accuracy on clean and adversarial samples with various activation
choices and s (α = 100).
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Figure 7: Comparison of training and test accuracy using different activation functions on
CIFAR-10 dataset (α = 100 and s = 0.1).
Next, to validate our findings in Section 3.2, we examine the performance
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of our method using different activation functions, including ReLU, PReLU,
LeakyReLU and Tanh. We fix α = 100 and allow s to be variable. As
reflected in Figures 6 and 7, on clean data, there is almost no difference in
the prediction accuracy for different activation choices. But, for adversarial
examples, using Tanh in the activation unit achieves best performance.
5. Concluding Remarks
It is a meaningful direction to improve the robustness of neural network by
improving the classification part of the network [18, 26, 27, 37]. This direction
could overcome some shortcomings of commonly used adversarial training
approaches [17, 32, 38], such as heavy computation load, and robustness
derived from the sacrifice of accuracy on clean data.
Along this line, in this paper, we first proved that the robustness of neu-
ral network is equivalent to certain margin condition between the classifier
weights. Further, from two different perspectives, we analyzed why non-
saturated function such as Tanh is a better activation choice than commonly
used ReLU type function under the framework like ours. Based on these find-
ings, we developed a novel light-weight-penalized defensive method, which
has a clear geometric background and can be easily used in various existing
neural network architectures. The experimental results clearly showed that,
in most cases, the proposed method outperformed the baseline defenses in
terms of both robustness and prediction accuracy.
There still leave some problems to be further investigated. In Section 3.2,
we analyze the relationship between activation choice and robustness intu-
itively, while rigorous theoretical analysis deserves further study. Moreover,
the paper focuses on the improvement of the classification part, and whether
it is possible to apply the developed ideas in improving the nonlinear encoder
part is also a promising problem.
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Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Let M ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric matrix such that Mi,i = a and
Mi,j = b, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, j 6= i. Then its determinant satisfies
det(M) = (a+ bn− b)(a− b)n−1. (A.1)
Proof. The desired result (A.1) could be obtained by applying an inductive
argument to the dimension n.
Lemma 2. For W ∈ RK×P , denote by wi the i-th row of the matrix. Suppose
that 1 < K ≤ P + 1 and
wTi wj =
{
1, i = j
ρ, j 6= i ,
where ρ is some constant. Then the following relation
ρ ≥ 1
1−K (A.2)
holds true. Moreover, there exists some W that makes the equality hold.
Proof. Set Σ = WW T . It is easy to verify that
Σij =
{
1, i = j
ρ, i 6= j.
Let λ be an arbitrary eigenvalue of Σ. Then using Lemma 1, we have
0 = det(λI − Σ) = (λ− 1− ρK + ρ)(λ− 1 + ρ)K−1,
which means that λ = 1+ρK−ρ or λ = 1−ρ. Since Σ is positive semidefinte,
then λ ≥ 0. Therefore,
1
1−K ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
which gives the desired inequality (A.2).
Next, we shall construct a special W from Σ to make the equality in
(A.2) holds true. First, we set ρ = 1
1−K
in Σ. It is easy to verify that the
rank of Σ is at most K − 1. Since Σ is symmetric, then there must exist
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a matrix V ∈ RK×K−1 such that Σ = V V T . Since P ≥ K − 1, we define
W = [V, 0] ∈ RK×P . It is easy to verify that this W satisfies
wTi wj =
{
1, i = j,
1
1−K
, i 6= j.
The proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. For brevity of statement, we assume that ‖wi‖ = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ K. Note
that (3.5) achieves its maximum if and only if there exists a solution to the
following optimization problem
min
W
max
1≤i,j≤K
j 6=i
wTi wj. (A.3)
First, we are to demonstrate that the optimal solution of (A.3) satisfies
the condition that all {wTi wj}, i 6= j are equal. If this is not true, there must
exist a optimal solution W˜ which violates the equal condition, such that
max
1≤i,j≤K
j 6=i
w˜Ti w˜j =min
W
max
1≤i,j≤K
j 6=i
wTi wj
≤ min
W∩{wTi wj=ρ}
max
1≤i,j≤K
j 6=i
wTi wj =
1
1−K , K > 1,
where the last equality follows from Lemma 2. Without loss of generality,
we assume that
w˜T1 w˜2 = max
1≤i,j≤K
j 6=i
w˜Ti w˜j ≤
1
1−K < 0. (A.4)
Since the inner products of the rows of W˜ are not all equal, there must exist
a row vector, denoted as w˜3, such that
w˜T1 w˜3 < w˜
T
1 w˜2.
Now, we construct an auxiliary vector w˜(t) from w˜1 and w˜2 as follows
w˜(t) =
tw˜1 + (1− t)w˜3
‖tw˜1 + (1− t)w˜3‖2 , t ∈ [0, 1].
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Note that w˜T1 w˜3 < w˜
T
1 w˜2 < 0. Then we have
‖tw˜1 + (1− t)w˜3‖22 < 1, ∀t ∈ (0, 1).
By (A.4), it is obvious that
(tw˜1 + (1− t)w˜3)T w˜j ≤ w˜T1 w˜2, ∀j 6= 1, 3.
Using the above two estimates, we have
w˜T (t)w˜j =
(tw˜1 + (1− t)w˜3)T w˜j
‖tw˜1 + (1− t)w˜3‖2
<
(tw˜1 + (1− t)w˜3)T w˜j
1
≤ w˜T1 w˜2, j 6= 1, 3.
(A.5)
Next, note that w˜T (1)w˜3 = w˜
T
1 w˜3 < w˜
T
1 w˜2. By properties of continuous
functions, we know there must exist a small ǫ > 0 such that for any t∗ ∈
(1− ǫ, 1), w˜T (t∗)w˜3 < w˜T1 w˜2 holds true. Combining this estimate with (A.5),
we have
w˜T (t∗)w˜j < w˜
T
1 w˜2, j 6= 1.
Set wˆ1 = w˜(t
∗). It is obvious that
max
1≤j≤K
j 6=1
wˆT1 w˜j < w˜
T
1 w˜2, j 6= 1.
Taking a similar argument, we can construct a series of wˆi, i = 1, 2, · · · , K
step by step, which satisfies
max
1≤i,j≤K
j 6=i
wˆTi wˆj < w˜
T
1 w˜2 = max
1≤i,j≤K
j 6=i
w˜Ti w˜j. (A.6)
However, (A.6) contradicts the fact that W˜ is the optimal solution to problem
(A.3). Thus, the optimal solution of (A.3) must satisfy the condition that all
wTi wj, i 6= j are equal. Finally, this property with Lemma 2 completes the
proof of the theorem.
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